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Abstract 
This paper examines technical efficiency of Portuguese pension funds management 
companies, using a stochastic frontier model in order to obtain estimates of economies 
of scale and scope. The empirical findings reveal a significant effect of efficiency 
measures on pension funds efficiency. Their implications for managers and policy 
makers are discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
The recent literature on incentives and informational asymmetries focusing on the 
effects of cost reduction by firms emphasises the endogeneity of costs (Laffont, 
1999). In the case of pension funds, their performance depends strongly on the 
competition and regulation environment they face, which may result in consolidation 
and balance sheet restrictions. Active investment management helps to keep markets 
efficient and to ensure the flow of funds to the most successful enterprises, playing a 
major role in the allocation of resources within the economy (see Bauer, Koedijk and 
Otten, 2005). Pension fund management companies are particularly important in this 
respect in contemporary economies, given the increase in the size of the aged and 
retired population and the consequent problems in guaranteeing the financial 
sustainability of social security (Davis, 1995).  
In this paper, we analyse the technical efficiency of Portuguese pension funds 
management companies from 1994 to 2003. Previous research on this topic includes 
the studies by Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005), who apply the DEA-CCR and 
DEA-BCC models to Chilean data; Barros and Garcia (2007), who analyse 
Portuguese data using a homogeneous stochastic frontier model, and Barros and 
Garcia (2006), who estimate four DEA models. The present paper contributes to this 
area of the literature by estimating for the Portuguese case a stochastic frontier model 
which enables us to identify significant economies of scale and of scope. The 
advantages of this approach are twofold. First, it allows for an error term combining 
different statistical distributions, which is an improvement on alternative 
specifications that rely on one specific distribution. Second, it allows for random 
parameters (i.e., parameters that describe characteristics not linked to observed 
characteristics, whereas the traditional frontier allows for variations related to 
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observed characteristics). This procedure may be more effective in achieving results 
than the traditional procedure, which considers all the pension funds as homogeneous. 
Therefore the aim of the paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier model disentangling 
heterogeneous and homogeneous explanatory variables to identify those variables 
which can be managed in a homogeneous way and those that must be managed by 
clusters. 
 Our analysis is motivated by some interesting features of Portuguese pension 
funds management companies. Firstly, mergers and acquisitions are present in the 
market during the period under examination, which indicates a constant effort by 
these companies to increase their size. Secondly, regulation restricts their 
discretionary power, forcing them to adopt efficient procedures. Such institutions 
enjoy a special relationship of trust and responsibility with the principal (either a 
person or an organisation), and must resolve conflicts of interest in favour of the 
principal or beneficiary (Lakonishok et al., 1992). Regulation oversees the conflict of 
interests in pension funds, restricting discriminatory practices by the pension fund 
companies. The Portuguese pension funds management industry reacts to these 
constraints by attempting to increase the efficient use of inputs. One procedure 
adopted for improving competitiveness is benchmarking, based on research on an 
industry’s best practices and on the idea that the widespread application of these 
practices can lead to improved performance throughout the industry. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. 
Section 3 surveys the relevant literature on this topic, whilst Section 4 presents the 
theoretical framework. Section 5 discusses the data and the empirical findings. 
Section 6 considers the implications of this study for managers and policy makers, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
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2.   The institutional context 
Pension funds have been in existence in Portugal for about twenty years. Decree-Law 
No. 323/85, of August 6, 1985, was the first legislative document regulating this 
particular market, establishing the legal regime for pension funds management and 
empowering the Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Authority to 
control and supervise such funds. In the twenty years since then, the registered growth 
has been quite significant: pension funds companies (collectively) currently constitute 
one of the country’s largest institutional investors, channeling ever-increasing 
volumes of savings from households and companies into productive investment, and 
occupying a prominent position in the organisation and functioning of the national 
capital market. 
 Pension funds can be managed either by specialist enterprises created for this 
exclusive purpose, operating under the name of pension funds management 
companies, or by insurance companies which are legally authorised to carry out life 
insurance activities in Portugal (Garcia, 2004). The great majority of pension plans, 
about 65 percent, are managed by specialist pension funds managers and the rest by 
insurance companies. Funds managed by funds management companies accounts for 
96 percent of pension funds value (Report of the Insurance and Pension Funds Sector 
(2003) of the Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Authority). The 
relevant legislation contains the regulations applying to pension funds companies. 
They manage pension funds charging fees that depend on the value of the pension 
funds under management. Therefore, they are profit organizations, like insurance 
companies, independently of their private or public nature. In the case of defined 
benefit plans, the sponsor undertakes the responsibility of paying the defined benefit, 
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so the sponsor is committed to regular financing; in the case of defined contribution 
plans the pension funds management company does not provide any guarantees 
concerning the rate of investment return. In the event of bad performance and high 
fees and administrative costs, the accumulated value decreases, meaning that the 
members bear the investment risk. However, this is a very competitive industry. 
Therefore, some pension funds management companies agree with some sponsors to 
guarantee a minimum rate of return on funds under management, bearing the cost if 
the effective yield is below the promised rate, which affects the company’s capital. 
Others do not guarantee this in the contractual rules, but agree on a market 
benchmark. If the performance is above that benchmark, the management company 
has additional commissions, without direct consequences in case of it being below it. 
There are even some situations where there is no rate of return guaranteed. However, 
if bad performance persists there is the risk that sponsors might move to other pension 
funds management companies. 
 These companies are subject to various regulations, especially investment 
rules, and are supervised by the Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory 
Authority.  They should meet certain minimum prudential standards with respect to 
their activities and conditions of operation. The competent authority has the power 
and the means to obtain regularly the statement of investment-policy principles, the 
annual accounts and the annual reports, and all the documents necessary for the 
purpose of supervision. Additionally, they must provide proper information for 
members and beneficiaries of a pension scheme, specifically about the financial 
soundness of the company, the contractual rules, the benefits and the actual financing 
of accrued pension entitlements, the investment policy, and the management of risks 
and costs. Also, they are required to have a minimum capital of one million Euros. A 
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prudent calculation of technical provisions is an essential condition to ensure that 
obligations to pay retirement benefits can be met. Therefore, these are calculated on 
the basis of recognised actuarial methods and certified by qualified actuaries and 
auditors.  
Closed pension funds are prominent among the various types of pension funds 
on offer. A closed fund is one in which there is only one sponsor, or, should there be 
more than one, there is a corporate, associative, professional or social connection 
between the sponsors, the consent of all of the existing sponsors being required before 
new sponsors can be added. Unlike open funds, closed funds are occupational in 
nature. In an open fund, there is no requirement for any connection whatsoever 
between the different parties adhering to the fund; instead, acceptance into the fund is 
granted by the fund’s managing institution.  
Our analysis focuses on pension funds management companies, which are the 
most important ones in this industry in Portugal. In 1994, there were 15 specialist 
funds managers. This number decreased over the period to 13 in 2003. We consider 
only 12 pension funds management companies. This is a balanced sample that also 
covers the period 1994-2003 when mergers and acquisitions took place. Table 1 
presents the characteristics of the pension funds management companies analysed in 
the paper. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
3.  Literature Review 
Although the existing literature is vast, only a small number of papers examine 
technical efficiency. Braberman et al. (1999) analyse Argentine pension funds 
management institutions using a Translog cost frontier model, applied to quarterly 
data from 1997Q2 to 1998Q1. A changing number of pension funds management 
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institutions are used in the analysis. Operating costs are regressed on three 
independent variables: the number of members/participants; the positive 
transferences/turnover (participant switching from one management institution to 
another) corrected in accordance with the proportion of participant employees of the 
pension funds management institution; and the profitability of the fund. Two dummy 
variables were included to take into account the changes in regulations after 
November 1997. Regulation was found to increase total costs but not to affect 
significantly relative efficiency.  
Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005) analyse Chilean pension funds 
management companies carrying out DEA-Data envelopment analysis, and adopting a 
two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the DEA efficiency scores are calculated, and, 
in the second stage, they are regressed on appropriate variables. Specifically, they 
used two outputs (total revenue and the number of contributors), and three inputs 
(marketing and sales costs, office personnel and executive pay, and administration 
and computing costs). In the second stage, they estimated a regression of the DEA 
scores on a constant, market share, sales, the ratio of contributors to affiliates and 
revenue. They concluded that there is no continuous trend towards an improvement in 
technical efficiency. An analysis of the determinants of efficiency shows that an 
increase in market share contributes positively to technical efficiency, whilst sales and 
marketing costs are detrimental.  
Barros and Garcia (2006) analyse the same sample with four DEA models, 
concluding that traditional DEA models are unable to discriminate adequately 
between Portuguese pension funds. Finally, Barros and Garcia (2007) analyse the 
efficiency of a sample of Portuguese pension funds with a homogeneous stochastic 
frontier model.  Therefore, the present paper, based on a stochastic frontier model, 
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represents an original contribution to this area of literature. As explained above, the 
advantages are the disentangling of homogenous and heterogeneous variables in the 
frontier model. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Our framework is based on two strands of the literature: models of industry 
efficiency and stochastic frontier models. 
4.1. Models of Industry Efficiency. 
Two competing models of industry efficiency exist in the literature. The 
strategic-group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977) explains differences in efficiency 
scores as being due to differences in the structural characteristics of units within an 
industry, which in turn lead to differences in performance. In the case of retailers, 
units with similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies with similar results 
in terms of performance (Porter, 1979). As there are different strategic options to 
be found in the different sectors of an industry, because of mobility impediments, 
not all options are available to each retailer, causing a spread in the efficiency 
scores of the industry. By contrast, the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; 
Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) accounts for different efficiency scores in terms 
of heterogeneity of resources and capabilities on which retailers base their 
strategies. These may not be perfectly mobile across the industry, resulting in a 
competitive advantage for the best-performing retailers.  
Purchasable assets cannot be considered to represent sources of sustainable 
profits. Indeed, critical resources are not available in the market. Rather, they are 
built up and accumulated on the retailer’s premises, their non-imitability and non-
substitutability being dependent on the specific traits of their accumulation process. 
The difference in resources thus results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and 
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in the retailer managers’ inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over 
time. In this context, unique assets are seen as exhibiting inherently different levels 
of efficiency; sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned 
and controlled by the retailers (Teece et al., 1997).  
 
4.2 Stochastic Frontier Models. 
In this paper, we adopt the stochastic cost frontier approach. This approach, first 
proposed by Farrell (1957), came into prominence in the late 1970s as a result of the 
work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen 
and Van den Broeck (1977). 
The frontier is estimated econometrically, and the difference between the 
inefficient units and the frontier is measured by the residuals. This is an intuitive 
approach based on traditional econometrics. By assuming that the residuals have two 
components (noise and inefficiency), one obtains the stochastic frontier model. 
Therefore, the main issue is the decomposition of the error terms. Let us present the 
model more formally.  The general frontier cost function proposed by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) is the following: 
 
(1)                 1,2,  t N,1,2,  i   ; ).( Tit
uitveitCitC …=…=
+= x  
 
where Cit and xit represent a scalar cost and a vector of variables including the input 
prices and the output descriptors present in the cost function of the decision-unit i 
under analysis in the t-th period, respectively. The error term ituitvit +=ε  has two 
components: uit, representing technical inefficiencies and assumed to be positive and 
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normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2uσ , and vit, namely the traditional 
error term of econometric models, assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed, representing the effect of random shocks (noise) and being independent of 
uit . The positive disturbance uit has a half-normal independent distribution truncated 
at zero, indicating that each fund management company’s cost must lie on or above its 
cost frontier. This implies that any deviation from the frontier is caused by 
management factors controlled by the pension fund management company.  
Denoting by 2vσ  and 2uσ  the variance of the traditional error term v and the 
inefficiency term u, respectively, the total variance of the error term is given by 
222
uv σσσ +=  . The contributions of the error and inefficiency terms to the total 
variance are )21/(22 λσσ +=v and )21/(222 λλσσ +=u , respectively, where λ 
provides an indication of the relative contribution of u and v to vu +=ε  and is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviations of u and v, 
v
u
σ
σλ =  . 
Because estimation procedures of equation (1) yields only the residual, ε, but 
not the inefficiency term u, the latter must be calculated indirectly (Greene, 2003). In 
the case of panel data, as in this paper, Battese and Coelli (1988) used the conditional 
expectation of uit, conditioned on the realised value of the error term, 
)( ituitvit +=ε , as an estimator of uit. In other words, [ ]itituE ε/  is the mean 
productive inefficiency for the i th pension fund management company at any time t.  
However, inefficiency can also be due to heterogeneity of the firms. To take 
this into account, we consider the following random effects model: 
itititiit uvwc ++++= xβ ')( 0β                         (2) 
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where the variables are in logs and iw  is a time invariant, firm-specific random term 
that captures company heterogeneity. To estimate the model, the identification 
condition requires the random components of the coefficients to be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables.  A second issue concerns the stochastic specification of the 
inefficiency term u. For the latter, we assume a Half-Normal distribution. For the 
estimation of the parameters, we construct the likelihood function using the approach 
proposed by Greene (2005). 
Under the previous assumptions, the conditional density of cit given iw is 
: 
itiitit
itit
iit wcwcf xβ')(  ,   
2)|( 0 −+−=

Φ

= βεσ
λε
σ
εφσ     (3) 
where φ  is the standard normal density function, and Φ  the respective cumulative 
distribution function. The parameters λ  and σ2 were defined before. 
Conditional on iw , the T observations for company i  are independent, and 
therefore the joint density for the T observations is 
∏
=


Φ

=
T
t
itit
iiTi wccf
1
1
2)|,...,( σ
λε
σ
εφσ                               (4) 
The unconditional joint density is obtained by integrating the heterogeneity out of the 
density, 
ii
w
T
t
itit
iTii dwwgccfL
i
)(2),...,(
1
1 ∫∏
=


Φ

== σ
λε
σ
εφσ           (5) 
The log likelihood, ∑
i
iLlog , is then maximised with respect to the parameters β0, β, 
σ, λ and any parameters appearing in the distribution of wi . The integral in (5) will be 
intractable. However, if one rewrites equation (5) in the equivalent form: 
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one can compute the log likelihood by simulation. Averaging the function given by 
(6) over sufficient draws from the distribution of wi will produce a sufficiently 
accurate estimate of the integral in (5) to allow estimation of the parameters (see 
Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996 and Train, 2003). The simulated log likelihood is 
∑ ∏∑
= ==


 

Φ

=
R
r
T
t
iritirit
N
i
s
ww
R
L
1 11
0
||21log),,,,(log σ
λε
σ
εφσθσλβ β        (7) 
where θ includes the parameters of the distribution of wi and wir is the rth draw for 
observation i (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
5. Data and results 
5.1 Data 
To estimate the cost frontier, we used a balanced panel on Portuguese pension funds 
management companies for the years from 1994 to 2003 (12 companies × 10 years = 
120 observations). Frontier models require the identification of inputs (resources) and 
outputs (transformation of resources). Several criteria can be used. One empirical 
criterion is data availability. Literature surveys can also be taken into account. The 
last criterion for measurement selection is the professional opinions of managers in 
the industry. In this paper, adopt all three criteria.  
Using the available data, we estimate a stochastic Translog cost function (see 
Varian, 1987). We have transformed the variables according to the description 
column in Table 2. We adopt the traditional log-log specification to allow for the 
possible non-linearity of the frontier.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
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The rationale for using capital-management services and capital-premises is the 
following. Pension fund management companies use commissions and premises to 
develop their activity. Therefore, in order to capture the specificity of this activity, we 
need to disentangle these two types of capital. 
 
5.2 Results 
 
We estimate a stochastic Translog cost function with three input prices (one price of 
labor and two prices of capital), and four outputs (profits, number of participants, 
number of closed funds and the existence or not of open funds under management). 
Linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by dividing monetary values by the 
price of the input price of capital-premises. The model is as follows: cit represents the 
cost of unit i for period t, which is divided by the price of capital-premises (PK2it) 
giving the term cit/PK2it; PLit is the price of labour, defined as the ratio of total wages 
to the number of workers, divided by the price of capital-premises (PK2it), which 
gives PLit/PK2it; PK1it is the price of capital-management services, measured by 
dividing the commissions value by the value of the pension funds under management, 
then divided by the price of capital-premises (PK2it) to obtain  PK1it/PK2it. Profit is 
the value of the unit profits. Participants is the number of the participants in the fund.  
Closed and open stand for the number of closed and open funds respectively. M&A is 
a dummy variable that is one for pension fund management companies which were 
involved in mergers and acquisitions in the period and zero otherwise. Share is the 
market share of the unit analysed, measured by the Herfindahl index. 
This cost frontier model is specified as an Error Components Model, following 
Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), in order to account for causes of efficiency controlled 
by the management (labor, capital, profit, participants, closed funds and open funds). 
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The regularity conditions require that the cost function be linearly homogeneous, non-
decreasing and concave in input prices (Cornes, 1992). Dividing money values by the 
price of the input imposes linear homogeneity in input prices. Considering m input 
prices, Pk (price of labour and price of capital-management services), n outputs, Yj , 
(profits, number of participants, number of closed funds and number of open funds), a 
quadratic trend, a dummy variables (M&A) and a Market Share index (Share), the 
model specification is the following: 
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Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for all the variables. Table 3 presents the 
results obtained for the stochastic frontier, under the assumption of  a Half-Normal 
distribution. For comparative purposes a non-stochastic frontier model and a 
traditional cost function are estimated. A GAUSS program was used for the 
estimation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 
The estimated cost function appears to fit the data well, as both the R-squared value 
and the overall F-statistic from the initial ordinary least-squares estimation used to 
obtain the starting values for the maximum-likelihood estimation are high. Having 
estimated two competing models, the homogeneous Translog frontier model and the 
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heterogeneous Translog frontier model, we carry out a Likelihood Ratio test to select 
the most adequate functional form. In the present case the test statistic has a χ2 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, its value is 12.510, with a critical value for 
p=0.05 equal to 5.991. Therefore, it can be concluded that the heterogeneous frontier 
model describes the data better than the Translog model. 
We also compute a Lagrange Multiplier test as a general specification test of 
adding variables to model. It has also a χ2  distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions imposed on the restricted model. In our case, the test 
statistic is equal to 10.123, and therefore the heterogeneous frontier model with the 
added variables is supported by the test at the 5% level. Finally, the σ2 and λ 
parameters of the frontier model are both statistical significant, which means that a 
traditional cost function is unable to capture adequately all dimensions of the data set. 
The estimated coefficients also have the expected signs, with cost exhibiting a 
negative trend, indicating technological progress during the period examined. 
Moreover, cost increases with the price of labour, the price of capital, profit, M&A 
and share, closed and open funds. However, the closed and open funds parameters are 
random parameters, and hence they vary along the sample.  Their mean values 
suggest that the number of closed and open funds are heterogeneous in our sample, 
and therefore policies to control costs should take into account this heterogeneity. A 
common policy based on the average values of the homogeneous variables will not be 
appropriate for all clusters identified in the heterogeneous variables. Different policies 
for the different segments of the pension fund management companies are needed. 
The model does not identify how many clusters exist in the sample, but only their 
heterogeneous nature. However, other techniques can be applied to identify the 
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clusters. The scale parameters of the heterogeneous variables are small, but 
statistically significant, confirming the presence of heterogeneity. 
 
5.3 Efficiency Scores 
  
Table 4 presents the results of the time-invariant efficiency scores computed from the 
residuals. Technical efficiency is achieved, in a broad economic sense, by the unit 
which allocates resources without waste, and thus refers to a situation on the frontier. 
Units with a score equal to one are on the frontier, while those with a score lower than 
one are above the cost frontier of best practices. The value of waste is measured by 
the difference between one and the score. For example, the waste of the worst 
performing pension funds management company, the Banif Açor Pensões, is (1-
0.753) = 0.247. This represents relative waste that should be eliminated in order for 
this institution to improve its performance. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
The mean score is 87.8%, which suggests that pension funds management companies 
could reduce their output cost by 12.2% without decreasing their inputs, which, in this 
case, are the prices of labour, of capital premises and of capital management services. 
The maximum fund score of 1 is achieved by SGF, while the minimum efficiency 
score of 75.3% is achieved by Banif Açor Pensões. The median is 88.4%, and the 
standard deviation 8.4%. These efficiency scores are high in comparison with those 
found in other activities, such as insurance (see Barros and Borges, 2005). High 
efficiency scores are typical of organisation operating in more competitive markets. 
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5.4 Economies of Scale 
Long-run scale economies (SCE) are calculated as one minus the cost elasticity along 
an output ray (Brown, Caves and Christensen, 1979), using the following formula:  
 
∑ = ∂
∂−= Mk kY
CSCE 1 ln
ln1          (9) 
 
where M is the number of outputs, and kYC ln/ln ∂∂ is the marginal cost of production k 
(k=1,2,…,M), which is given by the partial derivative of itClog  with respect to ktYlog , 
where itClog is given in equation (8) and ktYlog is the logarithm of output ktY  
(k=1,2,3,4). In the present case, the outputs are profits, participants, closed, and open 
funds. SCE stands for the change of total cost as all inputs are changed and the input 
prices remain constant. It is positive for scale economies and negative for scale 
diseconomies. When SCE is multiplied by 100, it can be interpreted as the percentage 
difference between cost and total revenue, which would arise from pricing all outputs at 
marginal cost (Brown, Caves and Christensen, 1979). Here the estimated average value 
for SCE is 1.528 with a standard deviation equal to 0.012. This indicates increasing 
economies of scale in pension fund management companies, with costs increasing with 
output. This result confirms prior research using different procedures (see Barros and 
Garcia, 2006).   
 
5.5 Economies of Scope 
 
The estimated cost function can be used to test hypotheses about economies of scope 
in production. Following Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1981) and focusing on the case 
of the cost interaction between closed funds and open funds, the joint parameter is 
defined as the partial derivative of  itClog  with respect to the term of interaction, 
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ln(open)*ln(closed), which measures the increase in marginal costs when open and 
closed funds increase. If this derivative (joint parameter) is positive, i.e. 
0
)ln*(ln
ln >∂
∂
closedopen
itC     (10) 
this indicates that costs increase because of the interactions arising from joint 
production.  
If instead 0
)ln*(ln
ln <∂
∂
closedopen
itC , then costs are a negative function of joint 
production.  
The estimated parameter is equal to -0.231, and therefore costs are found to 
decrease with joint production. A rational for this result is that these are two 
complementary technologies, which decreases costs. 
 
6.  Discussion 
How do we interpret the above results? First, we can conclude that random 
frontier models describe Portuguese pension fund management companies more 
accurately than homogenous frontier models. This is the main finding of the 
present paper. The implication of this result is that a common government policy 
for pension funds will not fit equally well all pension funds management 
companies, since heterogeneity exists between both close and open funds. 
Therefore any economic policy targeting them has to be tailored by clusters. 
Heterogeneity of pension fund management companies is not surprising.. There are 
small and large and medium companies. These visible characteristics translate into 
different performances and different clusters in the market. By contrast,  
Portuguese pension fund management companies appear to be relatively 
homogenous in terms of the price of labour and the price of capital premises. With 
regard to labour, this means that competition over resources drives the market and 
translates into homogenous dynamics in the labour market. As for capital premises, 
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it indicates that a certain level of investment in buildings is a pre-requisite in this 
market, which translates into homogenous behaviour.  
Second, the trend is negative, which indicates that cost decreases over time 
(and decreases at a increasing rate). This is to be expected for the pension fund 
industry, which is driven by technology improvements based on intense 
competition in the market.  
Third, the estimated λ inefficiency parameter indicates that on average 60% 
of the costs are imputable to inefficiency according to the homogenous frontier. 
However, the corresponding value for the heterogeneous frontier is 15%, which 
means that inefficiency characterises the homogenous frontier models. Moreover, 
σ is smaller in the stochastic frontier model, i.e. average homogenous inefficiency 
includes heterogeneity and therefore a heterogeneous frontier best describes the 
errors in this context. 
Finally, unique assets appear to be characterised by inherently different 
levels of efficiency: sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets 
owned and controlled by the pension fund management companies (Teece et al., 
1997). Strategic-groups theory (Caves and Porter, 1977), which justifies different 
efficiency scores on the grounds of differences in the structural characteristics of 
units within an industry, can also partly explain efficiency differences observed in 
the Portuguese pension fund management companies. 
Our study is comparable to Greene (2004, 2005), but only to some extent, as 
we estimate two frontier models, and clearly separate homogenous and 
heterogeneous variables, whereas Greene (2004. 2005) focuses on the statistical 
characteristics of the model. However, our findings confirm that homogenous 
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frontiers tend to include heterogeneity in their error terms, resulting in higher 
errors parameters. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have estimated a stochastic frontier cost model to investigate the 
existence of economies of scale and scope in a sample of 12 Portuguese pension funds 
companies over the period 1994 to 2003. Two competing models were considered: the 
homogeneous and the heterogeneous Translog frontier model respectively. Model 
selection criteria favour the latter specification. The scale parameters of the 
heterogeneous variables are small but statistically significant, supporting 
heterogeneity. But the chosen model does not identify how many clusters exist in the 
sample under examination - it only identifies their heterogeneity.  
As far as economies of scale are concerned, we find that they are increasing in 
pension funds companies - costs increase with output but at a low rate. Finally, joint 
estimation of two outputs (of both open funds and closed funds) shows that 
complementary technologies are used, which decreases costs.  Future research should 
investigate further the robustness of these results. 
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Table 1: Pension funds management companies in 2003 – Key indicators 
Companies Number of 
funds 
Ratio: 
Participants/ 
Beneficiaries 
(%) 
Ratio: Value of 
pension funds 
(thousands of 
Euros)/ 
Number of 
workers 
ROE (return on 
equity) (%) 
Banif Açor Pensões - SGFP, S. A. 8 65 62683.53 5.39 
BBVA Fundos - SGFP, S. A. 6 74 54120.46 17.06 
BPI Pensões - SGFP, S. A. 28 14 116611.1 41.93 
CGD Pensões - SGFP, S. A. 10 21 265500.8 10.73 
ESAF - SGFP, S. A. 12 26 44123.52 39.86 
Futuro - SGFP, S. A. 17 55 30422.34 7.23 
Pensõesgere - SGFP, S. A. 43 21 141871.5 41.24 
Previsão - SGFP, S. A. 3 12 69438.55 3.16 
Santander Pensões - SGFP, S. A. 4 10 434819.7 16.64 
SGF - SGFP, S. A. 13 56 5478.498 0.09 
SGFP do Banco de Portugal, S. A. 1 79 26874.33 1.35 
Unipensão - SGFP, S. A. 8 21 14157.21 1.44 
Source: Relatório do Sector Segurador e Fundos de Pensões (Report of the Insurance and Pension 
Funds Sector), 2003, ISP 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
Variable Description Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation 
Ln Cost Logarithm of 
operational cost in Euro 
at constant price 
1999=100 
0.577 3.317 2.252 0.672 
Ln PL Logarithm of price of 
workers, measured by 
dividing total wages by 
the number of workers 
-0.330 2.015 1.232 0.515 
Ln  PK1  -
management 
services 
Logarithm of price of 
capital-management 
services, measured by 
dividing the commissions 
value by the value of the 
pension funds under 
management 
-2.164 1.039 -1.346 0.341 
Ln  PK2  -
premises 
Logarithm of price capital-
premises, measured by 
dividing the expenditure on 
equipment and premises by 
the value of the pension 
funds under management 
-3.152 2.052 -1.161 0.737 
Ln Profit Logarithm of the profit in 
Euro at constant price 
1999=100 
0.155 3.709 2.251 0.745 
Ln participants Logarithm of the number 
of participants 3.001 5.024 4.029 0.529 
Ln closed Logarithm of number of 
closed funds  1.811 5.879 4.572 0.875 
Ln Open Logarithm of number of 
open funds  1.215 4.321 3.153 0.714 
M&A Dummy variable which is 
one for companies 
involved in Mergers and 
Acquisitions during the 
period 
0 1 0.45  
Share Market share of the 
companies measured by the 
Herfindahl index 
0.018 0.279 0.083 0.082 
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Table 3: Stochastic Translog panel cost frontier (dependent variable: Log Cost) 
 
 
Variables Random Frontier model Non Random Frontier Model 
Non-random parameters Coefficients 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficients 
(t-ratio) 
Constant (τ0) -0.2638 
(-4.790)* 
-1.0689 
(-0.385) 
Trend (τ1) -0.069 
(-3.128)* 
-0.0808 
(-8.334)* 
Trend2 (τ2) 0.127 
(2.917)* 
0.231 
(2.832)** 
Ln PL(α1) 0.8114 
(3.987)* 
0.7685 
(3.792)* 
Ln PK1 (α2) 0.1025 
(5.231)* 
0.138 
(0.218) 
Ln Profits(β1) 0.1861 
(4.125)* 
0.1935 
(1.312) 
Ln Participants(β2)  0.9405 
(0.813) 
Ln Closed(β3)   0.252 
(2.596)* 
Ln Open (β4)   0.159 
(2.316)* 
1/2LnPL2 (π11) -0.531 
(3.321) 
-0.453 
(3.129) 
1/2LnPK12 (π22) -0.163 
(2.452) 
-0.218 
(2.189) 
1/2LnProfits2 (δ11) 0.283 
(3.219) 
0.251 
(4.219) 
1/2LnParticipants2  (δ22) 0.255 
(3.452)* 
0.145 
(3.219)* 
1/2LnClosed2 (δ33) 0.523 
(3.453) 
0.452 
(3.218) 
1/2LnOpen2 (δ44) 0.321 
(3.652) 
0.218 
(3.219) 
LnPL*lnPK1 (π12) -0.247 
(1.652) 
-0.217 
(1.238) 
LnPL*lnProfits (θ11) -0.045 
(1.145) 
-0.021 
(1.037) 
LnPL*lnParticipants (θ12) -0.317 
(0.152) 
-0.231 
(0.034) 
LnPL*ln closed (θ13) 0.252 
(1.452) 
0.219 
(1.023) 
LnPK1*LnProfits (θ21) 0.237 
(1.568) 
0.128 
(1.239) 
LnPK1*LnParticipants (θ22) 0.389 
(1.316) 
0.432 
(1.045) 
LnPK1*LnClosed (θ23) -0.568 
(3.519) 
-0.432 
(3.983) 
LnPK1*LnOpen (θ24) -0.368 
(-2.813) 
-0.339 
(-2.743) 
LnProfits*LnParticipants (δ12) 0.358 
(4.156) 
0.330 
(4.563) 
LnProfits*Ln Closed (δ13) 0.345 
(3.673) 
0.358 
(3.563) 
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LnProfits*Ln Open (δ14) 0.521 
(3.378)* 
0.435 
(2.983)* 
Ln Participants* LnClosed (δ23) 0.238 
(2.973)* 
0.130 
(3.153)* 
Ln Participants* Ln Open (δ24) 0.239 
(3.892)* 
0.398 
(3.218)* 
Ln Closed * Ln Open (δ34) -0.231 
(-2.894)* 
-0.023 
(-1.023) 
M&A (η) 0.512 
(2.316)* 
0.385 
(2.173)* 
Share  (κ) 0.517 
(3.631)* 
0.396 
(2.318)* 
Mean for Random Parameters  
Ln Closed  0.5071 
(5.331)* 
 
Ln Open   -0.0742 
(-7.998)* 
 
Scale Parameters for Dists. Of Random Parameter  
Ln Closed  0.3183 
(3.698)* 
 
Ln Open  0.0858 
(4.703)* 
 
[ ] 2/122 UV σσσ +=  0.0438 (4.111)* 0.163 (2.741)* 
VU σσλ /=  0.151 (4.625)* 0.206 (2.255)* 
Log likelihood 
 
-294.343 
 
-288.088 
LR 8.321 6.393 
Chi Square (prob.) 142.683 
(0.000) 
 
R-adjusted 0.932 0.921 
F test:7,120 (prob.) 210.321 192.31 
Observations 120 120 
t Statistics in parentheses are below the parameters, those followed by * are significant at 1% level.  
 
 
Table 4: Efficiency Scores 
Pension funds management companies Efficiency Scores 
SGF 1.000 
Santander 0.982 
Futuro 0.953 
BBV Fundos 0.942 
Pensõesgere 0.910 
CGD Pensões 0.895 
Unipensão 0.873 
Banco de Portugal 0.870 
